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INTRODUCTION
Until April 2020, when the United States Supreme Court published its
decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, it was constitutionally permissible for a
person to be found guilty in the states of Louisiana and Oregon with only
10 out of 12 jurors voting to convict. 1 A jury vote that would result in a
mistrial in any other state could be enough for a conviction in Louisiana
and Oregon, depriving an individual of freedom for any number of years. 2
Simply crossing a state line could mean the difference between a
conviction and a chance at a new trial. 3
The history of Louisiana and Oregon’s draconian jury laws dates back
to the post-Reconstruction Jim Crow era. 4 Both states had explicitly racist
and white-supremacist reasons for enacting non-unanimous jury laws. 5
Louisiana enacted its non-unanimous jury law for felonies in 1898 as part
of a constitutional convention—the avowed purpose of which was to
“establish the supremacy of the white race.” 6 The facially race-neutral jury
rule was purposely constructed to escape scrutiny under the relatively new
Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The original law required a mere nine-person
majority to convict. 8 However, in 1973, the law was amended to require
10 jurors to obtain a conviction, putting the state in line with Oregon’s
non-unanimous jury law. 9 Under this regime, Black jurors were effectively
silenced, casting twice the number of “empty” votes for acquittal as their
white counterparts. 10 The rule also disproportionately affected Black
defendants. 11 Whereas white defendants had a 33% chance of a nonCopyright 2022, by EMMA C. LOONEY.
* J.D./D.C.L. candidate 2022, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. Special thanks to Kennedy Beal, Elyce Ieyoub, and Brittany Williams
Flanders for all their careful editing. The author dedicates this Comment to Dr.
Robert C. Looney in memoriam and to all those convicted without the unanimous
jury of their peers to which they were entitled.
1. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See generally id.; Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND.
L. REV. 1593 (2018).
5. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. LA. CONST. art. 116 (1898).
9. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (1974).
10. An empty vote is one that does not affect the outcome of the verdict.
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394; Frampton, supra note 4, at 1638.
11. Frampton, supra note 4, at 1638.
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unanimous conviction, Black defendants had a 43% chance of the same. 12
This regime was in place for more than 120 years, and non-unanimous
juries convicted thousands of defendants without the full agreement of the
jury in their case. 13 Effective in January 2019, Louisiana changed the law
to now require jury unanimity to reach a conviction. 14 This new
constitutional provision, however, only applies prospectively. 15 Therefore,
for all individuals in Louisiana convicted prior to this legislative change,
the courts were the only remaining hope for recourse. 16
Oregon’s non-unanimous-jury rule also had explicitly racist origins.17
In 1934, Oregon enacted its non-unanimous jury law to allow a conviction
with the approval of only 10 out of 12 jurors for any crime except firstdegree murder. 18 This period in Oregon’s history marked a powerful
resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan. 19 The law itself was enacted in response
to a wave of anti-Semitism following the conviction of a Jewish man for
murdering a Protestant. 20 Unlike Louisiana, Oregon never abrogated its
non-unanimous jury law, and it remained in effect until it was overruled
by the Ramos decision in April 2020. 21
In Ramos, the United States Supreme Court ended the practice of nonunanimous jury convictions when it held that the Sixth Amendment
requires jury unanimity at both the state and federal level. 22 Because of
this ruling, Oregon defendants were no longer subject to the threat of a
non-unanimous conviction, and individuals in both Louisiana and Oregon
whose convictions were not finalized could have a chance at a new trial. 23
However, the impact of Ramos was still unclear for those who had
already exhausted their direct appeals. 24 The Court explicitly declined to
rule on whether the new rule in Ramos should be applied retroactively to
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (2018).
15. Id.
16. See generally id.
17. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020).
18. OR. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (1857).
19. Aliza B. Kaplan & Amy Saack, Overturning Apodaca v. Oregon Should
Be Easy: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases Undermine the
Credibility of Our Justice System, 95 OR. L. REV. 1, 4 (2016).
20. Id. at 4–5.
21. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1407.
22. Prior to Ramos, jury unanimity was only required at the federal level. Id.
at 1394.
23. Id. at 1406; see infra Part I for a description of direct and collateral review
and an explanation of when a case is considered finalized.
24. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1407.
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individuals whose only choice to challenge their convictions is through
collateral review. 25 Thus, potentially thousands of individuals convicted
by non-unanimous juries were left without any certainty on whether they
would get another chance at freedom. 26
Such was the case for Thedrick Edwards. 27 In 2007, Mr. Edwards was
convicted of armed robbery, aggravated rape, and aggravated
kidnapping. 28 The jury deliberated for only three hours before putting the
then 19-year-old away for the rest of his life without the possibility of
parole. 29 However, the jury in his trial did not reach a unanimous
decision. 30 In fact, Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury laws operated exactly
as designed in this case—by silencing the influence of the single Black
juror who managed to escape the prosecution’s strikes during jury
selection. 31 This juror rendered the sole vote for acquittal. 32
When a conviction requires a unanimous jury, a holdout juror ensures
that deliberations will continue until that juror either convinces the other
jurors of the defendant’s innocence or is convinced of the defendant’s guilt
by the rest of the members of the jury. 33 If the holdout juror cannot
25. Id. “Collateral review” is defined as:
an attempt to undermine a judgment through a judicial proceeding in
which the ground of the proceeding (or a defense in the proceeding) is
that the judgment is ineffective. Typically, a collateral attack is made
against a point of procedure or another matter not necessarily apparent
in the record, as opposed to a direct attack on the merits exclusively. A
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is one type of collateral attack.
Collateral Attack, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also
discussion on direct and collateral review infra Part I.
26. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1407.
27. State v. Edwards, No. 2008-KA-20011, 2009 WL 1655544, at *1 (La. Ct.
App. June 12, 2009).
28. Id.
29. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Edwards v. Vannoy, 140 S. Ct. 2737 (2020) (No.
19-5807).
30. Id.
31. Id. Parties have several ways to eliminate potential jurors from a case
during voir dire, such as challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. These
strikes, especially peremptory challenges, have their own history of racism and
discrimination. See Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory
Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the “Blind” Peremptory, 29 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 981 (1996) for a discussion of peremptory challenges and jury
strikes.
32. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 29, at 5.
33. See generally H.H. Hansen & D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Time Jury May
Be Kept Together on Disagreement in Criminal Case, 93 A.L.R.2d 627 (1964).
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convince or be convinced, the result is a mistrial. 34 At the time of Mr.
Edwards’s conviction, however, Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury law
meant that “jurors in the majority never had reason to consider the
perspective or opinion of a minority of dissenting jurors, because—by
design—once the jury reached a consensus of ten, dissenting voices
became irrelevant.” 35 Instead of the mistrial that likely would have
resulted in the 48 other states, Mr. Edwards was permanently stripped of
his freedom without the unanimous agreement of a jury of his peers. 36
Since his conviction in 2007, Mr. Edwards exhausted all of his direct
appeals, and his conviction became finalized. 37 Thus, Mr. Edwards was
stuck in limbo along with the many other individuals who had exhausted
their direct appeals. 38
The United States Supreme Court chose Mr. Edwards’s case as the
vehicle to decide whether Ramos should be applied retroactively. 39 The
retroactivity standard that the Court uses in cases announcing new rules of
criminal procedure, like Ramos, comes from the 1989 Supreme Court
decision in Teague v. Lane. 40 However, even in his opinion in Ramos,
Justice Gorsuch hinted that the Court might be reluctant to find that the
jury-unanimity rule meets the extremely high bar of the Teague standard.41
The retroactivity standard in Teague has been a nearly insurmountable
standard for petitioners seeking to use a new rule of criminal procedure. 42
Under the Teague regime, new rules of criminal procedure do not apply
retroactively to cases that had already been finalized before the rule was
announced. 43 The only exceptions to this narrow standard were when the
new rule rose to the level of a substantive change in the law or constituted
a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure. 44 The cases meeting the
34. See generally id.
35. State v. Gipson, 296 So. 3d 1051, 1054 (La. 2020).
36. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 29, at 5.
37. Id. at 6.
38. In Louisiana, an estimated 1,600 individuals would be affected by a
retroactive application of Ramos. Id. at 16.
39. Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021).
40. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1407 (2020) (citing Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).
41. Id. Justice Gorsuch stated that the Teague test is “demanding by design”
and that the Court “will rightly take into account the States’ interest in the finality
of their criminal convictions” when applying the Teague standard to the new rule
of jury unanimity. Id.
42. Id.
43. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
44. Id. at 311.
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substantive exception are few and far between.45 The Teague Court
defined a watershed rule as one that implicates the fairness and accuracy
of a criminal proceeding 46 and is “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.” 47 The cases adopting the watershed exception are non-existent;
there has never been a case where a new rule of criminal procedure was
considered to be a watershed rule deserving of retroactivity. 48 And now,
there never will be. 49
Even before the Court forever altered the Teague standard in Edwards
v. Vannoy, the criminal retroactivity standard was prohibitively high, and
in practice it meant that very few individuals would ever be able to obtain
relief for a conviction obtained using procedures that had since been
deemed unconstitutional. 50 This was an outcome so unjust that it bordered
on the nonsensical, as the Teague standard ensured that individuals with
the oldest convictions under an unconstitutional rule are the most likely to
remain imprisoned because they have exhausted their direct appeals.51
Without minimizing the current racial inequality and biases in the court
system, there is no denying that historically, juries were even more apt to
convict for racist reasons than they are today. 52 The non-unanimous-jury
rules and their historical origins are proof of that fact. 53 But under Teague,
individuals convicted under the shadow of that historical regime had the
lowest possibility of relief because of the date of their conviction. 54 In a
country burdened by disproportionate and shameful mass incarceration,
not applying new constitutional rules of criminal procedure retroactively
is a missed opportunity to dismantle and reform the carceral state. 55
45. Ruthanne M. Deutsch, Federalizing Retroactivity Rules: The Unrealized
Promise of Danforth v. Minnesota and the Unmet Obligation of State Courts to
Vindicate Federal Constitutional Rights, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 53, 62 (2016).
46. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307.
47. Id. at 311.
48. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1407 (2020).
49. Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (2021) (eliminating the
watershed exception).
50. Deutsch, supra note 45, at 64.
51. Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or
“Redressability,” after Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give
Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in PostConviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 49 (2009).
52. See generally Frampton, supra note 4, at 1638.
53. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394.
54. See infra Part I for a discussion on collateral review and the length of
convictions.
55. Deutsch, supra note 45, at 56.
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However, instead of taking the opportunity presented by Edwards v.
Vannoy to extend the new unanimous-jury rule to those in Edwards’s
position, the Supreme Court chose to make the Teague standard even more
restrictive. 56 Thankfully, states are not required to follow the overly
restrictive standard that was established in Teague and narrowed in
Edwards. 57 The Court in Danforth v. Minnesota held that although Teague
is binding on federal courts, state courts are free to develop their own rules
of retroactivity. 58 Teague is merely the floor for state standards, not the
ceiling. 59 Therefore, even though the United States Supreme Court
declined to hold that Ramos was retroactive when it decided Edwards v.
Vannoy, Louisiana and Oregon are still free to grant retroactive relief to
those convicted by non-unanimous juries. 60 As Danforth clarifies, “the
remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the
Federal Constitution is primarily a question of state law.”61 Louisiana
should take advantage of the opportunity Danforth provided to craft a new
retroactivity standard that offers individuals convicted under state law who
have exhausted their direct appeals a new ground for review whenever a
rule of criminal procedure is declared unconstitutional. 62
Part I of this Comment will outline the historical development of the
retroactivity standard and describe its current application in Teague and
Edwards. Part II will highlight the unsatisfactory and unjust results of the
Teague standard by discussing examples of its application. Additionally,
this Part will discuss Danforth v. Minnesota and describe why Teague
constitutes a baseline standard for retroactivity without restricting states’
ability to construct their own standards above the Teague floor. Part III of
this Comment will show that Louisiana should do away with the Teague
standard by addressing how the standard fails to meet Louisiana’s criminal
justice goals. Part IV addresses the circuit split that has arisen in Louisiana
in the wake of Edwards v. Vannoy. Part V will provide a solution to
Teague’s failings: Louisiana should introduce its own, more equitable
retroactivity standard that takes into account the historically racist intent
and application of the rules of criminal procedure.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021).
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 288 (2008).
Id. at 291.
Id. at 288.
See generally id.
Id.
See State v. Gipson, 296 So. 3d 1051 (La. 2020); Danforth, 552 U.S. 264.
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I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RETROACTIVITY STANDARD
The history of the retroactivity doctrine has been and remains
“confused and confusing.”63 Therefore, a review of the development of
this doctrine is necessary to provide context for the current state of affairs.
Before examining the history of this rule, however, a brief discussion of
the criminal-appeals process is crucial. Until Edwards v. Vannoy, the most
important distinction that affected whether a new rule of criminal
procedure would be automatically retroactive or not64 was the procedural
posture of a petitioner’s case and, therefore, it is important to clarify the
meaning of each stage.
The key dividing line for the pre-Edwards retroactivity analysis was
between direct and collateral review. 65 Direct review is the process of
ordinary appeal. 66 This stage typically includes the trial itself, any appeal
to the intermediate court of the state, and then a discretionary appeal to the
state’s supreme court. 67 After direct appeals are exhausted, the defendant’s
conviction is final. 68 Collateral review is the process of post-conviction
appeal, including any federal or state habeas corpus petitions. 69 The
distinction between direct and collateral review is largely a product of
timing: the more time that has passed since a person’s conviction, the
further that person moves along these tracks toward a finalized
conviction. 70 As this Part will discuss, the timing of a defendant’s
conviction and stage of appeal over time became the primary deciding
factor in whether an individual’s conviction would stand despite the
advent of a new rule of criminal procedure. 71

63. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 271; see also Kendall Turner, A New Approach to
the Teague Doctrine, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (2014); Lasch, supra note 51,
at 3.
64. See discussion infra Section I.C.
65. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 266, 292 (1989).
66. Andrew I. Haddad, Cruel Timing: Retroactive Application of State
Criminal Procedural Rules to Direct Appeals, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1263
(2016).
67. Lasch, supra note 51, at 4.
68. Haddad, supra note 66, at 1263.
69. Lasch, supra note 51, at 5.
70. See generally id. at 4–5.
71. See discussion infra Sections I.A–D.
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A. From Common Law to Linkletter v. Walker
Originally, state courts were almost never bound by United States
Supreme Court decisions on criminal procedure. 72 Notably, even the
exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations was only binding on
federal courts until the landmark case Mapp v. Ohio, which was the first
to apply the exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence to the states in
1961. 73 Furthermore, prior to the decision in Mapp, jurisprudential
retroactivity was never given much attention, and, in fact, it was generally
considered a foregone conclusion. 74 When the Court announced a new
rule, it would typically produce a uniformly retroactive result. 75 This
Blackstonian view of the law assumed that the courts merely discovered
the law rather than created it. 76 Thus, at common law, all judicial decisions
were assumed to apply retroactively. 77 However, after announcing the new
rule in Mapp, the Court began to consider for the first time the practical
effects and costs that a new principle of criminal procedural law might
have on federal and state courts. 78
The Court addressed the concept of retroactivity for the Mapp rule for
the first time in Linkletter v. Walker. 79 In Linkletter, the Supreme Court
ventured into a sustained discussion of retroactivity to decide whether
individuals convicted prior to the Mapp decision who had exhausted all
their direct appeals should be allowed to raise the issue on federal habeas
corpus review. 80 In order to avoid the costs of upsetting the thousands of
cases that were decided prior to Mapp, the Court in Linkletter struck a
Faustian bargain and abandoned the longstanding adherence to the
common law retroactivity regime.81 The Court held that the retroactivity
of a new rule of criminal procedure must be determined on a case-by-case
basis “by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation.” 82 In short, the Court felt that the thousands of cases decided
72. Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of
Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1082 (1999).
73. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
74. Roosevelt, supra note 72, at 1082.
75. Id.
76. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622–23 (1965).
77. Id. at 622.
78. Lasch, supra note 51, at 11.
79. Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618.
80. Roosevelt, supra note 72, at 1089.
81. Lasch, supra note 51, at 11.
82. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629; see also Deutsch, supra note 45, at 59.
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prior to Mapp could not be “obliterated.” 83 Thus, finality won out over
justice.
B. Stovall v. Denno: The Linkletter Rule Clarified:
In 1967, the Court clarified the retroactivity standard that came out of
Linkletter. 84 The Court in Stovall v. Denno articulated the test for
retroactive application of a new criminal procedure rule, which
considered: “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards,
and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards.” 85 In Stovall, the Court embraced
“selective prospectivity” and further restricted the retroactive application
of new judicially created rules. 86 The Stovall test ensured that the practical
costs of applying a new rule could always be used to justify the denial of
retroactive application, putting financial costs before the uniform
application of a constitutional principle. 87 Stovall cemented the threeprong test for retroactivity and ensured that later cases decided under the
Stovall regime would be subject to this perverse cost-benefit analysis.88
One such case was Desist v. United States, in which the Court refused
to apply the new Fourth Amendment standard articulated in Katz v. United
States 89 retroactively. 90 Using the Stovall test, the Court found that
applying the Katz standard retroactively would “increase the burden on the
administration of justice” by instigating a substantial number of costly
appeals in which it would be difficult to determine after the fact “whether
a particular instance of eavesdropping led to the introduction of tainted
evidence at trial.” 91 The Court further found that applying the Katz
standard retroactively would overturn pre-Katz decisions that fairly relied
83. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
84. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
85. Id. at 297.
86. Lasch, supra note 51, at 17 (citing Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300–01).
“Selective prospectivity” describes the situation in which a new rule is applied to
the litigants before the court but not to any similarly situated litigants. See
Roosevelt, supra note 72, at 1092.
87. See generally id.
88. Id. at 16.
89. The Court in Katz held that physical intrusion was not necessary to
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment and that merely recording a
conversation was sufficient. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
90. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
91. Id. at 251, 253.
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upon the old rules without serving to deter any similar searches or seizures
in the future. 92 Thus, the Desist Court continued to employ the selective
prospectivity regime from Stovall 93 and allowed the particular litigants in
Desist to take advantage of the new Katz standard, while denying this right
to every other individual convicted prior to its 1967 decision. 94
Accordingly, Katz did not apply retroactively to anyone, except the five
litigants in Desist, either on direct or collateral review. 95
In his dissent in Desist, Justice Harlan proposed a solution that would
later be adopted in Griffith v. Kentucky and Teague v. Lane. 96 Justice
Harlan proposed that the Stovall rule should not apply to cases pending on
direct review. 97 He reasoned that for individuals with remaining appeals,
it would be unfair to “pick and choose” who among them would receive
the benefit of retroactivity.98 Those with remaining appeals, in Justice
Harlan’s opinion, should get the benefit of retroactivity. 99 However,
Justice Harlan’s largesse did not extend to those who had exhausted their
direct appeals. 100 Justice Harlan agreed that courts collaterally reviewing
habeas petitions need only look to the laws in place at the time of the
original proceeding. 101
C. Griffith v. Kentucky: Harlan’s Distinction Enshrined
In Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court abandoned the Stovall test for cases
pending on direct review. 102 The Griffith Court considered whether the
decision in Batson v. Kentucky 103 dealing with racially discriminatory jury
selection would apply retroactively to individuals still undergoing the
direct appeals process. 104 The Court adopted Justice Harlan’s Desist
92. This deterrence justification might be argued in the context of other rules
of criminal procedure. However, the mere fact that applying a rule retroactively
will not deter further misbehavior is not a reason to withhold retroactive
application. See infra Part IV; Desist, 394 U.S. at 253.
93. Lasch, supra note 51, at 18 (citing Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300–01).
94. Id.
95. See discussion infra Part I for an explanation of direct and collateral
review.
96. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 259.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 263.
101. Id.
102. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
103. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
104. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 320.
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argument that the Stovall regime should be done away with for individuals
on direct appeal and that the distinction between direct and collateral
appeals should be reinstituted. 105 The Court based its decision on the
principle that similarly situated defendants should receive the same
treatment. 106 To the Court, it made no sense for the lucky defendant who
was granted certiorari to have the new rule apply retroactively in their case
but in no others. 107 As Justice Harlan put it, this merely constituted
“fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle
for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a
stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new
rule.” 108 Still, this new rule in Griffith, while proclaiming equal treatment
under the law, protected only those with recent enough convictions to still
have direct appeals. 109 An individual whose appeals were finalized one
day before the Griffith decision was announced had no recourse, while a
defendant with one day remaining on appeal had a whole new opportunity
to utilize the Batson standard. 110 This arbitrary distinction became
solidified in Teague v. Lane, and it remained the retroactivity standard in
use until Edwards v. Vannoy. 111
D. Teague v. Lane: The Current Landscape of Retroactivity
Two years after Griffith, the United States Supreme Court did away
with the Stovall retroactivity standard for individuals on collateral appeal
when it decided Teague v. Lane. 112 The new retroactivity standard under
Teague imposed an extremely high bar for retroactivity, arguably even
more stringent than those in Linkletter113 and Stovall. 114 Under Teague,
new rules of criminal procedure would generally not be applied
retroactively to individuals whose convictions were finalized before the
new rule was announced. 115 This general bar to retroactivity illustrates just
how far the Court has departed from the presumption of retroactivity at
105. Haddad, supra note 66, at 1270.
106. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323.
107. Id.
108. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323.
110. See id.
111. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
112. Id.
113. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
114. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
115. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
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common law. 116 In 25 short years, the Court nearly entirely dismantled the
opportunity for individuals to utilize new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure to challenge their convictions, moving from the Blackstonian
presumption of retroactivity to a presumptive bar against it. 117
The Court also announced two narrow exceptions to the general bar
against retroactivity in Teague. 118 The first exception applied when a new
rule was substantive rather than procedural, meaning that the rule put
“certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of
the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”119 In a later case, the
Court framed the substantive exception as applying when a new rule
“alter[ed] the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law
punishes.”120 Alternatively, if a new rule was deemed to be procedural
rather than substantive, retroactivity might still have been available under
the second exception in Teague, which applied when the court announced
a new “watershed” rule of criminal procedure that was “central to an
accurate determination of innocence or guilt” and “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.” 121
However, in the 32 years that the watershed exception was in effect,
the Court never found a new rule of criminal procedure to qualify as a
watershed rule. 122 Furthermore, the Court suggested that there may never
be a case to meet this burden. 123 In fact, the Court has stated that Gideon
v. Wainright124 may have been the only case that would constitute a
watershed rule were it decided under Teague. 125 In Gideon, the Court held
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied to the states and
required state courts to appoint attorneys to represent indigent
defendants. 126 The Court felt that Gideon likely would have constituted a
watershed procedural rule because “when a defendant who wishes to be
represented by counsel is denied representation . . . the risk of an unreliable
116. See Roosevelt, supra note 72, at 1082.
117. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618; Stovall, 388 U.S. 293; Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); Teague,
489 U.S. 288.
118. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
119. Id.
120. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004).
121. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
122. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1407 (2020).
123. Deutsch, supra note 45, at 63.
124. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
125. Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021); see also Deutsch, supra note
45, at 63 (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007)).
126. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
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verdict is intolerably high.”127 This wrongly implies that there is such a
thing as a tolerably high risk of an unreliable verdict.
Gideon is inarguably a landmark case, and the new rule it announced
is widely considered a “right without peer” because without access to a
lawyer, it is nearly impossible to properly take advantage of any other
constitutional right or principle. 128 But the prominence of this right should
not dilute the application of others. 129 If Gideon is the posterchild for a
watershed procedural rule, then “the rule is easily paraphrased: nothing is
as important as Gideon, so nothing is retroactive.”130 An exception that
can never be fulfilled is not really an exception at all. Consequently,
Justice Kavanaugh agreed with this sentiment in doing away with the
watershed exception altogether in Edwards v. Vannoy. 131
Therefore, under the retroactivity standard in Teague, a petitioner had
high hurdles to clear in order to obtain retroactive application of a new rule
of criminal procedure. 132 First, the court had to determine whether the rule
on review was new or merely an application of an existing rule to new
facts. 133 If the petitioner could successfully argue that her case merely
rested on an existing rule, then the petitioner could “avail herself of the
decision on collateral review.” 134 However, if a petitioner’s case was
deemed to rest on a new rule, then it was subject to Teague’s extremely
high threshold for retroactivity. 135 The Teague Court defined a new rule as
one that either “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the
States or the Federal Government” or one in which “the result was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction
became final.” 136 A rule that “breaks new ground” would indeed be a rare
thing to see, but a rule that merely was “not dictated by precedent” could
arguably refer to an application of an existing framework to a novel set of
facts. 137 This “newness” standard covered a wide range of possibilities,
and some have said that this first hurdle was little more than “a screen for
covert rulings on the merits.” 138
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419.
Justin F. Marceau, Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 2484 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (2021).
See generally Deutsch, supra note 45.
Id. at 62.
Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347 (2013).
Deutsch, supra note 45, at 62.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (emphasis removed).
Lasch, supra note 51, at 27.
Id. at 28.
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After this newness hurdle, the rule would need to either be substantive
or rise to the level of a watershed rule—somewhere above and beyond
Gideon v. Wainwright in terms of implicating “concept[s] of ordered
liberty.” 139 The following chart illustrates the steps of the Teague
analysis. 140
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When the Supreme Court decided Edwards v. Vannoy, not only did it
find that the unanimous-jury rule from Ramos did not meet this high
139. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
140. See id. at 301, 310–311; Haddad, supra note 66, at 1270; Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353
(2004).
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standard of a watershed rule, but it also did away with the watershed
exception altogether. 141 This next Part will explore how the Teague
standard has functioned over time prior to this elimination of the watershed
exception.
II. TEAGUE APPLIED: HOW THE RETROACTIVITY STANDARD WORKED IN
PRACTICE
Although the Court eliminated the watershed exception in Edwards v.
Vannoy, 142 it is still important to see how the Court applied the Teague
doctrine as it stood before this unexpected alteration. Furthermore, the
Edwards Court left the rest of the Teague doctrine in place, including the
substantive exception. 143 Therefore, this Part will discuss the application
of the Teague doctrine in pre-Edwards jurisprudence.
A. The Substantive Rule Exception
In practice, cases have only occasionally met the substantive exception
under Teague. One recent example of a case that met this exception is
Welch v. United States. 144 In Welch, the Court held that a new rule
announced in Johnson v. United States145 was substantive and therefore
retroactive for individuals on collateral review.146 In Johnson, the Court
struck down a portion of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 147 that
was void for vagueness. 148 This portion of the law imposed a steeper
penalty for felons in possession of firearms if the offender had three or
more prior serious drug offenses or violent felonies. 149 However, the law
defined a violent felony as one that “involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 150 The Court in
Johnson found this phrase to be too vague to provide fair notice to
defendants, and thus struck it down as void for vagueness. 151

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (2021).
Id.
Id.
Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016).
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015).
Welch, 578 U.S. at 129.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Johnson, 576 U.S. at 606.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Johnson, 576 U.S. at 597.
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Whether this new rule should be applied retroactively was a question
that the Johnson Court left open for another day. 152 In Welch, the Court
took up this question and held that the rule announced in Johnson was
substantive because it altered the range of conduct that the law
punished. 153 Therefore, individuals convicted under the prior version of
the Armed Career Criminal Act could use the decision in Johnson to
petition the court under collateral review.154
The Court in Welch also pointed out an important distinction about the
meaning of substantive and procedural rules. 155 The Court stressed that the
nature of a new rule depended on the function of that rule rather than the
right that underlies it. 156 In other words, a new rule that affects the
operation of a substantive right, such as the right to jury unanimity under
the Sixth Amendment, can still be considered a procedural rule if it merely
affects the operation of that right. 157 This reveals a critical flaw in the
Teague structure: the artificial line drawn between the substance of a right
and the procedural application of that right. In reality, these two concepts
are not so easily separable as illustrated in cases that fail to meet the high
standard for the watershed exception.
B. The Watershed Procedural Rule Exception
Schriro v. Summerlin158 exemplifies the fictional nature of the division
between substantive and procedural rules. In this case, the Court
determined whether a new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona159 would
apply retroactively. 160 The Ring decision invalidated Arizona’s capital
sentencing scheme, which gave judges too much authority in determining
capital sentencing. 161 Under the old scheme, after a jury convicted an
individual of first-degree murder, it fell to the trial judge alone to make a

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016).
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 358.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
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finding of fact in order to determine whether aggravating factors were
present to support the death penalty. 162
In Schriro v. Summerlin, the Court held that Ring would not apply
retroactively to individuals who had exhausted their direct appeals. 163 The
Court reasoned that even though juries may be more accurate fact-finders
than judges, this fact did not significantly diminish the accuracy of all
death sentences prior to Ring in Arizona. 164 This justification presents a
contradiction: that the capital sentencing scheme was too inaccurate to
continue, but not so inaccurate that the death sentences issued under it
should be reevaluated. 165
Even in a life-or-death situation, the Court refused to hold that the rule
in Ring was substantive or, at the very least, articulated a watershed rule
of procedure. 166 Schriro’s particular situation is especially shocking to
consider, as his defense attorney was having an affair with the prosecutor,
and the judge who sentenced him may have confused the facts of his case
with the facts of another defendant sentenced that same day.167 Even for
defendants with less shocking factual situations, the holding in Schriro
deprived them of an opportunity for resentencing. 168 Schriro virtually
guaranteed these individuals’ deaths, not because of a decision of a jury of
their peers, but from the decision of a single judge assigned to their case.169
The Court, in holding that this law did not satisfy a Teague exception,
allowed an unconstitutional scheme to guarantee the deaths of individuals
who had not been convicted in accordance with their Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
C. Danforth v. Minnesota: Freeing States from Teague’s Constraints
Under this highly restrictive regime, in 2008 the United States
Supreme Court provided a chance for states to diverge from the Teague
standard. 170 In Danforth v. Minnesota, 171 the Court addressed retroactivity
162. Id; C. Ryan Russell, Death Anyways: Federal Habeas Corpus
Retroactivity Law and the Decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, 83 OR. L. REV. 1389,
1394 (2004).
163. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 358.
164. Id. at 355–56.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 358.
167. Russell, supra note 162, at 1389.
168. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002).
169. Id.
170. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
171. Id.
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stemming from the new rule announced in Crawford v. Washington.172
The Crawford case dealt with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment and its relation to out-of-court statements made by witnesses,
holding that the hearsay rules in the Federal Rules of Evidence cannot
usurp a defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses at trial. 173
In Danforth, the petitioner sought, and was ultimately denied, relief
under the new Crawford rule in state habeas proceedings.174 There, the
Minnesota Supreme Court applied the Teague standard and found that the
Crawford rule did not constitute a watershed procedural rule, reasoning
that a new rule “must do more than simply improve the accuracy of a
proceeding” to qualify as a watershed exception.175 The Minnesota
Supreme Court reasoned that the new rule espoused in Crawford might
even make convictions less accurate by excluding some reliable instances
of hearsay, and therefore it could not qualify as a watershed procedural
rule. 176 Danforth then appealed the Minnesota Supreme Court decision and
asked the United States Supreme Court to consider whether Teague
constrained the authority of state courts “to give broader effect to new
rules of criminal procedure.” 177 The Court concluded that Teague was
binding on all federal courts but only constituted a baseline requirement
for states. 178
Thus, states are free to construct their own broader retroactivity rules
and grant retroactive relief beyond what is required in Teague. 179
However, few have taken advantage of this new opportunity. 180 This is
especially concerning when considering the underlying justification
behind the distinction between direct and federal collateral appeals
espoused in Teague. 181 The Court in Teague specifically stated that one of
its justifications for the general bar against retroactivity on collateral
review was deference to state courts. 182 It makes little sense for states to
defer to the rationale in Teague when the very purpose behind Teague was
to preserve deference to state courts’ direct-review process. 183
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 68.
Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 460 (Minn. 2006).
Deutsch, supra note 45, at 68; Danforth, 718 N.W.2d at 460.
Danforth, 718 N.W.2d at 460.
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008).
Id. at 282.
Deutsch, supra note 45, at 68.
Id. at 70.
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 266, 306 (1989).
Id.
Deutsch, supra note 45, at 75.
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A historical review of the development of retroactivity reveals two
things. First, retroactivity used to be the norm and has only changed
relatively recently because of jurisprudence relying on a misplaced attempt
to save states’ money. 184 Second, a denial of retroactivity produces overly
harsh results that deny individuals the right to constitutionally sound
proceedings based solely on the date of their conviction.185 Theoretically,
a difference of one day in the date that final appeals are fully exhausted
could mean that one defendant gets a chance at a new trial or sentence but
another does not, merely because his trial happened to be docketed for a
slightly earlier date.186 Under the current retroactivity regime, any number
of trivial events can mean the difference between retroactivity or not. The
decision of a judge to take a vacation and delay the cases on his docket or
the sickness of an attorney forcing a delay in the trial might be the reason
one defendant can utilize a new rule while his neighbor in the same cell
block might not. Needless to say, this is highly arbitrary and unjust.
Thankfully, the Danforth rule gives states an opportunity to override this
harsh scheme within their borders. 187
III. EDWARDS V. VANNOY: THE DEATH OF THE WATERSHED EXCEPTION
The Teague regime was already a steep barrier for any new rule of
criminal procedure. Then, Edwards v. Vannoy presented a double blow to
advocates of prison reform: by denying retroactivity to the new rule of jury
unanimity announced in Ramos v. Louisiana and by making the
retroactivity barrier even steeper by eliminating the watershed
exception. 188 First, the Court held that Ramos did not constitute a new
watershed rule of criminal procedure.189 Justice Kavanaugh reasoned in
part that the Ramos rule could not be a watershed rule if the rule in Duncan
v. Louisiana190 was not. 191 In Duncan, the Court ruled that defendants had
the right to a jury trial in state criminal cases. 192 In DeStefano v. Woods,
the Court held that the right to a jury trial announced in Duncan would not

184. See supra Section I.A.
185. See supra Section II.A–B.
186. See generally Teague, 489 U.S. at 310; see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.
314, 323 (1987).
187. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 282 (2008).
188. Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (2021).
189. Id. at 1559.
190. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
191. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1559.
192. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149–150.
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be retroactive. 193 Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that jury unanimity was a
“subsidiary” right to the rule announced in Duncan, and therefore the right
to a unanimous jury shouldn’t be retroactive if the right to a jury itself was
not. 194
Furthermore, in deciding that Ramos would not be retroactive, Justice
Kavanaugh stated that “conducting scores of retrials years after the crimes
occurred would require significant state resources” 195 and “costs imposed
upon the States by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional
law on habeas corpus thus generally far outweigh the benefits of this
application.” 196 Although Justice Kavanaugh rightfully pointed out that
retrying certain old cases would be traumatizing to past victims, he
neglected to place the blame for this renewed trauma where it belongs: in
the hands of the state for failing to meet its burden of proof at the first trial
and convince all jurors beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s
guilt. 197 Therefore, as in Linkletter v. Walker in 1965, cost and finality won
out over justice. 198
In addition to holding that the new rule in Ramos was not a watershed
rule of procedure, the Court went a step further and eliminated the
watershed exception entirely. 199 Ironically, the Court pointed to the very
issue that critics of the Teague doctrine have focused on for years as the
reason for this elimination: the fact that the watershed exception has never
been successfully invoked. 200 Justice Kavanaugh stated, “Continuing to
articulate a theoretical exception that never actually applies in practice
offers false hope to defendants, distorts the law, misleads judges, and
wastes the resources of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts.
Moreover, no one can reasonably rely on an exception that is non-existent
in practice . . . .”201 However, instead of addressing this problem by
expanding the watershed exception into a working doctrine, the Court

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968) (per curiam).
Edwards, 593 U.S. at 1558.
Id. at 1554.
Id. (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).
Id.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1560.
Id.
Id.
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chose to eliminate it entirely.202 Thus, in the aftermath of Edwards v.
Vannoy, the Teague analysis at the federal level is as follows:203
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IV. WHY TEAGUE NEEDS TO GO: THE PROBLEMS WITH A COST-BENEFITANALYSIS APPROACH
Louisiana should expand upon the Teague regime and use it as a floor
rather than a ceiling when deciding the retroactivity of a new rule of
criminal procedure. Currently, individuals who have exhausted their direct
appeals are left with no opportunity to take advantage of any new rule that
would have invalidated their conviction had it only occurred more
recently. This time-based constraint is illogical. Further, the current
Teague approach incorporates a cost-benefit analysis that is both immoral
and logically unsound. For these reasons, a new, Louisiana-based
202. Id.
203. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 266, 301, 310, 311 (1989); Haddad, supra
note 66, at 1270; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987); Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004); Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1558–60.
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approach to retroactivity should expand the timing constraints of
retroactivity to include individuals whose convictions have been finalized
and should afford more weight to the effects of denying retroactivity on
defendants over the potential costs of retroactive application of a new rule
on the system.
It must be briefly noted that Louisiana is powerless to overrule the
United State Supreme Court’s determination that a rule is new rather than
an application of a preexisting rule to new facts. 204 The “newness” of a
rule is a threshold consideration, and an analysis of retroactivity, either
under Teague or under a Danforth-enabled state standard, does not become
relevant unless the procedural rule is considered new.205 Therefore, if the
Supreme Court has determined a rule to be new, Louisiana is bound to at
least use Teague as a retroactivity floor.206 Louisiana is also powerless to
sink lower than the substantive or watershed exceptions. 207 These
exceptions are the binding floor to any retroactivity analysis. 208 Thus, if
the Louisiana Supreme Court wishes to take advantage of the Danforth
opportunity, they must expand the retroactivity standard rather than
contract it.
One of the primary considerations the Court undertook in deciding
Teague was the desire to avoid the costs of reconsidering previously
finalized cases. 209 The Court found retroactivity undesirable because it
“continually forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in
prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing
constitutional standards.”210 However, the costs of administering
additional proceedings for individuals after a new rule is announced do not
exist in a vacuum. Instead, these costs should be considered in light of the
extremely expensive regime of mass incarceration with which America
generally and Louisiana specifically struggle.
Currently, there are over 2.2 million people in American prisons and
jails. 211 This constitutes a 500% increase over the last 40 years—far too
204. Deutsch, supra note 45, at 62.
205. Id.
206. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 288 (2008).
207. Id. at 282. Because Louisiana adopted the Teague standard as the standard
for state collateral rule, Louisiana still retains the watershed exception. However,
like at the federal level, this exception has never been used in Louisiana. See infra
Section V.A.
208. Id.
209. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 266, 310 (1989).
210. Id.
211. In 1980, there were approximately 315,000 incarcerated individuals in
America, while in 2018, there were over 1.4 million. Id.
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much to be attributed to population growth. 212 Furthermore, this growth
cannot merely be accounted for by people with short-term sentences.213
One in nine prisoners is incarcerated for life, and one in three of those
individuals has no possibility of parole. 214
As bleak as these numbers are on the national level, Louisiana’s are
even worse. 215 In fact, Louisiana’s rate of imprisonment is double the
national average. 216 Louisianans are also more likely to receive life
sentences, and the number of individuals currently incarcerated for life is
nearly triple what the total prison population was in 1970. 217 Despite
decreasing crime rates, Louisiana has also seen a large increase in the
prison population over time, with the prison population increasing
sevenfold over the last 40 years. 218
These numbers are not without cost. Nationally, prison costs now
account for one out of every fifteen state discretionary spending dollars.219
Furthermore, these numbers are growing, not shrinking. 220 In fact,
criminal-justice costs are the second fastest growing category in state
budgets behind only Medicaid. 221 Louisiana is not exempt from these
costs. 222 In 2018, Louisiana spent $868 million, nearly 10% of Louisiana’s

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See generally id.
216. Louisiana incarcerates people at a rate of 1,619 per 100,000 residents.
Mass Incarceration, A.C.L.U. LA., https://www.laaclu.org/en/issues/massincarceration [https://perma.cc/G4F2-Y3LV] (last visited Oct. 1, 2020).
217. Lea Skene, Report: Number of People Serving Life in Louisiana Dwarfs
Entire State Prison Population in 1970, ADVOCATE (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_31f0dc98-5
4cd-11ea-807c-b3a2c890a656.html [https://perma.cc/9BMA-PC7C]. According to
the most recently available data, Louisiana currently has 4,895 individuals serving
life sentences. See State-by-State Data: Louisiana, SENTENCING PROJECT,
https://www.sentencingproject.org/the-facts/#map [https://perma.cc/3BV8-Q8BQ]
(last visited Oct. 21, 2020).
218. In 1980, there were 8,889 total incarcerated individuals in Louisiana.
Today, however, there are over 63,000. State-by-State Data: Louisiana, supra
note 217. See also Mass Incarceration, supra note 216.
219. Fiscal Cost of Mass Incarceration, A.C.L.U., https://www.aclu.org/issues/
smart-justice/mass-incarceration/fiscal-cost-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/L
66Y-FCW7] (last visited Oct. 1, 2020).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. State-by-State Data: Louisiana, supra note 217.
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total spending, on corrections out of a total budget of approximately $9.5
billion. 223
In a state that has experienced recent budget shortfalls and painful
spending cuts, 224 prison costs seem like the most reasonable area to save
money. Other budget categories, such as education and healthcare
spending, have a relatively fixed number of affected individuals, meaning
that cuts in these categories are limited by the unchanging number of
individuals who utilize these services. 225 For example, although cuts to the
education budget can reduce the amount spent per child, there is no direct
way to reduce the total population of children enrolled in Louisiana public
schools through spending cuts alone. However, the same is not true for the
prison system. 226 States can and do release individuals from the corrections
system all the time when their sentences run out or when they are granted
parole, thus eliminating the need to spend corrections money on those
individuals. 227
There are many steps that other states can and have taken to reduce
their prison populations. Some examples are reducing or eliminating
mandatory minimum sentences, eliminating habitual-offender laws, or
creating and expanding diversionary court programs such as those focused

223. Id.; Overview: Fiscal Year 2018 Budget, LA. BUDGET PROJECT (Mar. 13,
2017), https://www.labudget.org/2017/03/overview-fiscal-year-2018-budget/#:~:
text=Gov.,to%20fund%20general%20government%20operations [https://perma.
cc/T84T-67Z3]. Corrections spending “reflects the costs to build and operate
prison systems and may include spending on juvenile justice programs and
alternatives to incarceration such as probation and parole.” NAT’L ASSOC. OF
STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2019 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 60 (2019),
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/9d2d2db1-c943-4f1bb750-0fca152d64c2/UploadedImages/SER%20Archive/2019_State_Expenditure
_Report-S.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BPA-X86N].
224. For a primer on Louisiana’s budget woes, see Jan Moller, Louisiana
Budget Crisis: Stop Settling for Scraps, LA. BUDGET PROJECT, http://www.
louisianapartnership.org/resources/Documents/LBP%20Budget%20and%20Tax
%20La%20Partnership.pdf [https://perma.cc/75XR-2M8Y] (last visited Nov. 15,
2020).
225. See generally Overview: Fiscal Year 2018 Budget, supra note 223.
226. See generally Dennis Schrantz et al., Decarceration Strategies: How 5
States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions, SENTENCING PROJECT
(Sept. 5, 2018) https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/decarcerationstrategies-5-states-achieved-substantial-prison-population-reductions/ [https://pe
rma.cc/6UDF-LYHH].
227. Id.
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on drugs and addiction. 228 However, in Louisiana, a retroactive application
of the prohibition on non-unanimous juries as well as other new
constitutional rules that may arise represent untapped strategies to further
reduce the prison population. 229
In the context of the Ramos rule and the subsequent Edwards decision,
it is clear that a large percentage of individuals currently in prison in
Louisiana today are there because of a now-unconstitutional rule. 230 Nonunanimous jury laws have allowed Black Louisianans to serve on juries
while effectively eliminating any effect their votes might have had on the
outcome of a case. 231 The results of this discriminatory policy, according
to one study that reviewed 3,000 felony trials over a six-year period in
Louisiana, show that 40% of all trial convictions were the result of a nonunanimous jury vote. 232 Out of documented non-unanimous jury
convictions, Black defendants were convicted at a 30% higher rate than
their white counterparts. 233 The juries responsible for these convictions
tended to be whiter than their surrounding communities, with the average
jury in East Baton Rouge Parish having two fewer Black jurors than would
be representative of the overall community. 234 Thus, it is clear that the
impact of retroactive application of the Ramos case could be substantial
on individual defendants and on the prison system as a whole.
Critics (as well as Justice Kavanaugh) might argue that the large
number of impacted individuals is a reason not to apply Ramos
retroactively. After all, holding new proceedings for a large chunk of the

228. Id. For an in-depth discussion on Louisiana’s habitual-offender laws, see
Harper G. Street, Breaking the Chains of a Habitually Offensive Penal System:
An Examination of Louisiana’s Habitual-Offender Statute with Recommendations
for Continued Reform, 82 LA. L. REV. 963 (2022).
229. See supra Introduction for a discussion on the impact of non-unanimous
jury laws. See also Frampton, supra note 4, at 1638.
230. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020); Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S.
Ct. 1547 (2021).
231. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394.
232. Jeff Adelson et al., How an Abnormal Louisiana Law Deprives,
Discriminates and Drives Incarceration: Tilting the Scales, ADVOCATE (Apr. 1,
2018), https://www.nola.com/news/courts/article_8e284de1-9c5c-5d77-bcc5-6e
22a3053aa0.html [https://perma.cc/4Y5V-HYG2].
233. Id. This article “reviewed about 3,000 felony trials over six years, turning
up 993 convictions rendered by 12-member Louisiana juries in which the
newspaper was able to document the jury votes.” White defendants had a 33%
chance of a non-unanimous conviction while Black defendants had a 43% chance
of the same, which amounts to a 30% difference. Frampton, supra note 4, at 1638.
234. Adelson et al., supra note 232.
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prison population would undoubtedly be costly. 235 For example, the cost
to taxpayers for the average homicide trial is between $22,000 and
$44,000, and the cost of the average robbery trial is between $600 and
$1,300. 236 However, housing prisoners is also a highly costly endeavor.237
Louisiana pays over $16,000 per prisoner per year on average. 238 It stands
to reason that older prisoners would be more expensive to house as their
medical needs increase with age. Therefore, a lifetime of housing an
individual is an expensive task. In only a few years, the cost of corrections
far outweighs the cost of even a homicide trial, and corrections costs
outpace the cost of a lesser trial in a matter of months. These costs seem
even steeper when considering that many individuals are imprisoned due
to the operation of now unconstitutional laws and procedures.
Therefore, over time, it would actually save the state money to revisit
the cases of people who have exhausted their direct appeals. Although not
every person allowed to take advantage of a constitutional rule will be
released, this still provides an opportunity for the state to revisit older
convictions that may no longer be in Louisiana’s best interest.
Furthermore, the financial cost of implementing a new rule pales in
comparison to the injustice of denying people the application of a new
constitutional rule merely because they have been convicted for a longer
period of time. The Court in Griffith espoused the principle that similarly
situated defendants should be subject to the same treatment in deciding
that retroactivity should be granted to individuals with remaining direct
appeals. 239 This same principle should be extended to those whose
convictions are finalized. Yes, those individuals are at a different
procedural stage, but this does not change the fact that their convictions
rest in whole or in part on an unconstitutional principle that could have
completely changed the outcome of their case had it been heard today.
Therefore, Louisiana should take advantage of the opportunity presented
in Danforth v. Minnesota240 to create a broader rule of retroactivity that is
more reflective of the state’s values.
235. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1406 (2020).
236. Pricilla Hunt et al., The Price of Justice: New National and State-Level
Estimates of the Judicial and Legal Costs of Crime to Taxpayers, 42 AM. J. CRIM.
JUST. 231, 231 (2016).
237. Prison Spending in 2015, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://www.vera.org
/publications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends-prison-spend
ing [https://perma.cc/JSA2-SC92] (last visited Oct. 1, 2020).
238. Id.
239. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987).
240. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
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IV. A LOUISIANA OPPORTUNITY: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER
RETROACTIVITY
Since Edwards v. Vannoy was decided, several Louisiana circuit
courts have considered whether to take advantage of the opportunity
provided by Danforth to apply Ramos retroactively in state proceedings.241
In November 2021, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decided
against a retroactive application of Ramos in the case of David A.
Nelson. 242 Nelson was convicted of manslaughter in 2012 by a nonunanimous jury. 243 The Third Circuit acknowledged that Louisiana was
free to apply Ramos retroactively in light of Danforth.244 However, the
court declined to do so. 245
The Third Circuit reasoned that because Louisiana has not applied
rules like those from Batson and Crawford retroactively, there is no
justification for treating the Ramos rule any differently. 246 The court,
although acknowledging that Edwards did not eliminate the watershed
exception for Louisiana courts, found that the Ramos rule did not meet that
impermissibly high bar, stating that “we cannot fathom any different
conclusion than that of the United States Supreme Court that Ramos does
not satisfy the ‘watershed’ exception set out in Teague.” 247
However, on the same day, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal took the opposite approach in State v. Melendez, applying Ramos
retroactively in granting the individual a new trial.248 The court began by
examining and acknowledging the racist history behind non-unanimous
juries and stated that this policy has “had a profound effect on non-white
defendants.” 249 The court found that based on this racist history, the Ramos
241. John Simerman, New Rulings Set Up Louisiana Supreme Court
Showdown over 1,500 Non-unanimous Jury Verdicts, NOLA.COM (Nov. 11, 2021),
https://www.nola.com/news/courts/article_6c4e7c96-4310-11ec-9410-336bb579
72ca.html [https://perma.cc/8YLH-P6TU].
242. State v. Nelson, No. 21-461, 2021 WL 5232244 (La. App. 3d Cir. Nov.
10, 2021).
243. Id. at *2.
244. Id. at *9.
245. Id. at *17.
246. Id. at *15.
247. Id. at *16. Because the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the Teague
standard as a whole in State ex. rel. Taylor v. Whitley, the watershed exception is
technically still available to Louisiana courts on state collateral review. See infra
Section V.A.
248. State v. Melendez. No. 2021-K-0597 (La. App. 4th Cir. Nov. 10, 2021).
249. Id. at *3.
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rule should be applied retroactively “in the interest of justice and
fundamental fairness.” 250
At the time of these Louisiana circuit court decisions, there were at
least 200 requests for the Louisiana Supreme Court to consider the
retroactivity of Ramos on the state level. 251 In light of the new circuit split
and the many pending requests to the Louisiana Supreme Court, it is highly
likely that the court will soon decide the final hope for a new trial of those
convicted in Louisiana by non-unanimous juries. When the court takes up
this question, it will not only have the opportunity to retain the watershed
exception that Edwards eliminated at the federal level, but also to expand
upon the deeply flawed Teague retroactivity analysis and to create a more
just standard for Louisianans.
V. WHAT LOUISIANA SHOULD DO INSTEAD: A PURPOSEFUL APPROACH
TO RETROACTIVITY
Louisiana has the freedom to build on the Teague standard and expand
retroactivity beyond its current bounds. 252 The current approach is limited
by the uncertain status of the watershed exception due to its elimination at
the federal level and the out-of-place cost considerations. 253 In order to
combat these limitations, the Louisiana Supreme Court should adopt two
additional exceptions to the general bar to retroactivity: a purpose-based
exception and an outcome-based exception.
A. Consider the Intent and Purpose of the Old Rule
The Louisiana Supreme Court should create a new exception to the
Teague standard that incorporates a consideration for the intent and
purpose of any old, unconstitutional rule. This exception would be
beneficial for two reasons: first, because it would expand the scope of
retroactivity beyond its current limits and, second, because it would allow
the state to address and rectify a long history of discriminatory criminal
laws. 254

250. Id.
251. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal Holds Ramos Retroactive in PJI Case,
THE PROMISE OF JUST. INITIATIVE (Nov. 10, 2021), https://promiseofjustice.org
/news/fourth-circuit-court-of-appeal-holds-ramos-retroactive-in-pji-case
[https://perma.cc/7QNS-YMT3].
252. See supra Section II.C.
253. See supra Part III.
254. See supra Introduction for a brief discussion of Louisiana’s racist laws.
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Louisiana only officially adopted the Teague standard in 1992 in the
case State ex. rel. Taylor v. Whitley. 255 In this case, the Louisiana Supreme
Court addressed the potential retroactive application of Cage v.
Louisiana. 256 In Cage, the United States Supreme Court found that a jury
instruction “equating reasonable doubt with a ‘grave uncertainty’ and an
‘actual substantial doubt’ and stating that what was required was a ‘moral
certainty’ that the defendant was guilty, was constitutionally defective.”257
Although on remand the Louisiana Supreme Court found the jury
instruction in Cage’s case to be harmless error, Cage v. Louisiana still was
a new rule in need of a retroactivity analysis. 258
In Taylor, the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the Teague standard
for the first time to determine whether Cage should be applied
retroactively. 259 The Court determined that the Cage rule met neither the
substantive exception nor the watershed exception, and thus, it was not
retroactively applied. 260 Even in this initial case, the Louisiana Supreme
Court chafed against the Teague standard, wrongly asserting that they
were not bound to adopt it and that doing so was merely the Court’s
choice. 261 This assertion was later partially justified by Danforth v.
Minnesota, which clarified that states are only bound to use Teague as a
floor. 262
At the time of the Taylor decision, there was already pushback against
the adoption of Teague. 263 Justice Calogero in his Taylor dissent suggested
that Louisiana should not use Teague. 264 Justice Calogero relied on
Louisiana Constitution article I, section 21, which states that the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended in Louisiana. 265 This article must be
read in concert with Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 930.3,
which states that a petitioner in custody shall be granted relief if “the
conviction was obtained in violation of the constitution of the United
States or the state of Louisiana.”266 Justice Calogero stressed the
importance of state proceedings as the venue in which to vindicate federal
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1992).
Id.; Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1991).
State ex rel. Taylor, 606 So. 2d at 1293 (citing Cage, 498 U.S. 39).
State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125 (La. 1991).
State ex rel. Taylor, 606 So. 2d at 1296.
Id. at 1299–300.
Id. at 1296.
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 288 (2008).
State ex rel. Taylor, 606 So. 2d at 1301 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (citing LA. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (2018)).
La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 930.3.
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constitutional rights. 267 He reasoned that with Teague restricting
opportunities for federal relief, state collateral proceedings were an
increasingly important opportunity to address now-unconstitutional
convictions. 268 Furthermore, Justice Calogero addressed the fear that “the
gates of the penitentiary may be flung open” if new rules were deemed
retroactive more frequently. 269 He dismissed this fear, reasoning that cases
with harmless error would remain settled. 270 Finally, he emphasized that
Mr. Taylor should not be disadvantaged merely because of the timing of
his conviction. 271 The Louisiana Supreme Court should adopt Justice
Calogero’s reasoning that state collateral proceedings are a legitimate
venue in which to vindicate constitutional rights. 272
In her dissent to a denial of certiorari in State v. Gipson, former
Louisiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Bernette Johnson suggested a new
test for retroactivity, and in doing so, referred to and expanded on Justice
Calogero’s earlier dissent. 273 Louisiana should build upon Justice
Calogero’s call for a state-based solution and adopt Chief Justice
Johnson’s test in order to create a new exception to the general Teague bar
to retroactivity. In Gipson, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied certiorari
in a case calling for a retroactive application of Ramos v. Louisiana.274
Chief Justice Johnson would have granted certiorari in this case and wrote,
assigning her reasons. 275 Although she felt that Ramos should clear
Teague’s high bar, Chief Justice Johnson still asserted that Teague was an
outdated and overly restrictive standard that should be abandoned. 276 She
argued that the cost-benefit approach enshrined in Teague has no place in
determining fundamental rights. 277 Chief Justice Johnson then proposed a
new approach: one that builds beyond the misplaced scheme that has
dominated the past 40 years of criminal procedure and institutes a new
purposeful view of retroactivity. 278
Chief Justice Johnson suggested that a new Louisiana retroactivity
standard should include a “consideration of whether a stricken law had a
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

State ex rel. Taylor, 606 So. 2d at 1301.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1301.
State v. Gipson, 296 So. 3d 1051, 1054 (La. 2020).
Id. at 1052.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
Id.
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racist origin, has had a disproportionate impact on cognizable groups or
has otherwise contributed to our state’s history of systemic discrimination
against African Americans.” 279 The Louisiana Supreme Court should
adopt Chief Justice Johnson’s test as the first additional exception to the
Teague bar on retroactivity.
This new purposive exception would expand the scope of retroactivity
by providing certainty to new rules like the one in Ramos that were created
with such explicitly discriminatory reasons.280 When an old rule was so
clearly intended to accomplish discriminatory goals, there is no need to
descend into an analysis of whether the rule was successful in
accomplishing its hateful purpose; the mere history of an intentionally
discriminatory rule should be sufficient to create a presumption that it was
successful. Under this new exception, even if the United States Supreme
Court determines that Ramos does not meet either the substantive or
watershed exception, the Louisiana Supreme Court would be able to
analyze the discriminatory and racist purpose of the law and apply Ramos
retroactively anyway.
B. An Outcome-Determinative Factor
In addition to Chief Justice Johnson’s purposive consideration,
Louisiana should also build upon the federally defunct watershed
procedural exception and create a new avenue for retroactivity that
considers whether a new rule of criminal procedure could have changed
the outcome of a case. The watershed exception was meant to grant
retroactivity when a rule is “central to an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt.” 281 In practice, this standard proved to be too exclusive
to be workable, and its elimination destroys this possibility entirely.282
Instead, the Louisiana Supreme Court should build this test into a new
standard that would provide retroactivity to a new rule of criminal
procedure that could have affected the outcome of a conviction.
This expansion above and beyond the watershed exception would shift
the focus from whether a new rule affected the “accurate determination of
innocence or guilt” to a focus on the outcome of a conviction.283 First,
although accuracy may be the ultimate goal of our criminal procedures,
innocence and guilt are often not the determining factors in the outcome
279. Id.
280. See discussion supra Introduction for a brief recounting of the racist
history of non-unanimous jury laws.
281. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989).
282. Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (2021); see supra Part II.
283. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.
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of a criminal prosecution. 284 Procedures matter. To paraphrase a famous
quote from Crawford v. Washington, dispensing with a constitutional rule
of criminal procedure would be akin to dispensing with a jury trial because
a defendant is obviously guilty. 285 Likewise, courts should not withhold
the protection of procedures merely because we are fairly certain that the
end result was “correct.” This does not erase the fact that such an outcome
would be based on unconstitutional procedures. Furthermore, in many
instances, the initial use of now-unconstitutional procedures obscures any
chance of gauging whether innocence or guilt was accurately determined
in the first place. 286
The Louisiana Supreme Court should clarify and expand upon the
watershed procedural exception in Teague and create an outcomedeterminative exception to the general bar to retroactivity. If the
application of a new constitutional rule could have resulted in a different
outcome for a defendant, then that defendant should have the opportunity
to take advantage of that rule even if they have exhausted their direct
appeals.
This standard would ensure that meaningful procedural changes in the
law would not be reserved only to the benefit of those with newer
convictions. Further, retroactivity would be the assumption rather than the
rare exception. If these new exceptions were adopted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the Teague analysis would be modified as illustrated in
this chart. 287
284. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule in
Mapp applies regardless of the probative value of evidence. A piece of evidence
might definitively prove a defendant’s guilt, but our court system will still exclude
it if it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This is merely one
example of the valuation of procedural safeguards outweighing the accuracy of
innocence or guilt.
285. The quote in full is: “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is
obviously guilty.” Crawford v. Washington, 51 U.S. 36, 62 (2008).
286. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020); see also supra
Introduction for a discussion on the effects of non-unanimous jury laws that
allowed for shortened jury deliberations.
287. I have included only the relevant part of the chart for purposes of this
discussion and eliminated the first steps of the Teague analysis that were
discussed previously. For a full presentation of the earlier steps of this analysis,
see chart supra Section I.D. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 310, 311; Haddad, supra
note 66, at 1270; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987); Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004); State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d
1292, 1301–02 (La. 1992) (Calogero, J., dissenting); State v. Gipson, 296 So. 3d
1051, 1054 (La. 2020); Crawford, 51 U.S. at 62.
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General bar against retroactive
application of a new rule of
criminal procedure.
Substantive
Exception

Purposive
Exception

OutcomeDeterminative
Exception

Does the rule "alter[]
the range of conduct or
the class of persons the
law punishes?"

Does the rule have
a discriminatory
purpose or intent?

Could the rule have
altered the outcome of the
defendant's case?

If yes, the rule
can be applied
retroactively.

If yes, the rule
can be applied
retroactively.

If yes, the rule
can be applied
retroactively.

For example, if this outcome-determinative exception were adopted, a
case like Edwards v. Vannoy would be subject to a retroactive application
of Ramos in a Louisiana state court even if it would not be in federal
courts. 288 In Edwards, the jury did not reach a consensus before handing
down a conviction. 289 Therefore, a retroactive application of the new rule
in Ramos could have changed the outcome of his case. Yes, it is possible
that after continued deliberations, the lone holdout juror may have been
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt; however, it is just as possible that
the case might have resulted in a hung jury and a mistrial.290 This case is
an example of one that would meet a new outcome-based exception.
Another example of a case that would have met the outcome-based
exception is Crawford v. Washington. 291 When the Minnesota Supreme
Court was evaluating whether the new Crawford rule should be made
retroactive, they reasoned that this new rule did not meet the watershed
procedural exception because it could lessen the accuracy of convictions
by excluding reliable instances of hearsay. 292 Under the proposed
288. Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021). Under the proposed solution
in this Comment, Edwards would meet both the purposive and outcome-based
exceptions.
289. State v. Edwards, No. 2008-KA-20011, 2009 WL 1655544, at *1 (La. Ct.
App. 2009).
290. See generally Hansen & Buckner, supra note 33.
291. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; see supra Section I.C. for a full presentation of
Crawford.
292. Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 460 (Minn. 2006).
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outcome-based exception, however, the fact that Crawford did not
implicate the accuracy of guilt or innocence would be irrelevant. Instead,
the analysis would depend on whether the exclusion of some hearsay
because of the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment could affect
the outcome of a case. If a Louisiana petitioner’s case decided before
Crawford might have reached a different outcome because of the
exclusion of some testimonial hearsay, then Crawford would be given
retroactive effect under the outcome-based exception.
Louisiana is a state that has been burdened by a history of racism and
racist laws. 293 These laws have had measurable effects on outcomes in the
criminal-justice system. 294 To counteract the negative effects that this
history has engrained within the justice system, Louisiana should impose
a new retroactivity test that considers the real-world purpose and impact
of old rules in determining whether to apply new rules retroactively.
Further, rather than adhere to the current Teague/Edwards regime,
Louisiana should create two new exceptions—a purposive exception and
an outcome-based exception—that would do away with arbitrary timing
divisions and ensure that all individuals receive equal protection under
new constitutional rules.
CONCLUSION
The Teague standard is an outdated, unjust, and illogical system. It
virtually guarantees that cases announcing new constitutional rules will
have no teeth. 295 This problematic foundation has been made all the worse
by the elimination of the watershed exception. 296 Although it is true that
future defendants and those convicted recently enough to still have direct
appeals will have a chance to take advantage of new constitutional rules,
those who have been incarcerated the longest will have no opportunity to
right the unconstitutional wrongs that occurred in their cases.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court decided Edwards v. Vannoy, it
is time to replace the current, dysfunctional regime. Because of the
opportunity Danforth presents, Louisiana is as well situated as any state to
introduce a new retroactivity regime. In fact, our state is in a particularly
unique situation in which it is even more necessary to do so. We have the
highest rates of mass incarceration, and therefore a more aggressive
retroactivity standard would benefit us more than most.
293. See generally Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020);
Frampton, supra note 4, at 1638.
294. See generally Frampton, supra note 4.
295. See generally Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 266 (1989).
296. Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (2021).
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Expanding on and rebuilding the Teague standard will provide for a
more just, even application of constitutional principles. Incorporating new
purpose- and outcome-focused exceptions to the current framework will
realign Louisiana’s retroactivity regime with our values. The date of
someone’s conviction should have no bearing on their chance for justice.

